On Wednesday night, the US Treasury announced the US and Ukraine had reached an agreement on US preferential access to Ukraine’s mineral, oil, and gas resources. 

The agreement, signed by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Ukraine’s Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko, provides for a “reconstruction investment fund” that will invest in the extraction of Ukraine’s natural resources and its related infrastructure, with profits shared between the two countries after the first 10 years. The document still needs to be approved by the Ukrainian parliament before going into effect.

The deal had been long in the making and has been repeatedly brought up by Trump as a way for Ukraine to “pay back” the US for its extensive military aid. The finalized agreement does not include any requirements for Ukraine to directly reimburse the US for past or future defense aid. 

Instead, the two countries will invest in resource mining; the profits will go into post-war reconstruction for the first 10 years, after which they will be shared between the US and Ukraine. Although the two countries will “jointly manage” the investment fund, Ukraine will retain “full control” over its natural resources, and determine “where and what to extract,” said Svyrydenko. 

Ukraine has extensive deposits of natural resources: it ranks 51st in terms of the world’s largest oil reserves and holds much of the world’s uranium, iron, and natural gas resources. The country is also a crucial source of rare earth metals, a group of elements used in everything from microprocessors for cellphones, to medical technology, cancer drugs, and military guidance systems. 

Right now, the biggest exporters of rare earth minerals are China, Russia, and Malaysia, with most Western countries lacking their own extraction and refinery facilities and thus relying on imports. The EU imports around 40% of its rare earth metals from China, while the US is reliant on China for 70% of its imports, which form the vast majority of its total resources: the US only has one functioning mine and no refineries. 

As the US and China remain locked in a trade war, tariffs and Chinese export restrictions imposed last month will make it harder for the US to source the critical metals. This deal could secure long-term access to natural resources for the US and strengthen US-Ukraine trade despite the past months’ diplomatic difficulties. 

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As reported by the Financial Times, Apple plans to move all of its US iPhone production to India.

More than 60 million iPhones are sold annually in the US. Apple plans to source this from India in its entirety by the end of 2026. 

This is a significant pivot away from China, where Apple has established its production over decades. An estimated nine in 10 iPhones are made in China – accounting for nearly 200 million devices – and approximately 150 of Apple’s top 187 suppliers had factories in China in 2024.

India is subject to a baseline levy of 10% by the US; the 27% ‘reciprocal’ tariff which it was set to face has now been put on hold until 9 July. 

On the other hand, China has been hit by import taxes of up to 145%, and China has hit back with a 125% tax on American products. Although developments this morning show promising signs of de-escalation – US President Donald Trump told reporters, “We may reveal it later, but they had meetings this morning, and we’ve been meeting with China” – relocating to India may instil more confidence amongst investors.

After Apple entered China in the 1990s, the relationship between the company and the country has been one of reciprocal benefit. As China opened up to the world, Apple grew more entrenched in its manufacturing sector.

In an interview last year, Apple’s CEO Tim Cook said, “There’s no supply chain in the world that’s more critical to us than China.” Both in practice and in threat, tariffs have forced U-turns in manufacturing strategies for many large American businesses.

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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has just published its World Economic Outlook as of April 2025, portending a fall of global GDP growth by 0.5%, to 2.8% for the year. 

This is largely the result of the “major negative shock” that US President Donald Trump’s tariffs have imposed on the global economy.

The report is structured in three chapters, covering global policy, demographic impacts (including of an ageing population), and the impact of refugee and migration policy on economic growth, particularly within developing economies.

Since February, the US has announced multiple waves of tariffs against trading partners, culminating in near-universal levies on 2 April, which triggered historic drops in equity markets. Though markets partially recovered following pause announcements after 9 April, uncertainty—especially regarding trade policy—has surged to unprecedented levels.

The impacts of tariffs, IMF reports, vary considerably across countries. In the US, where demand was already softening, growth projections have been lowered to 1.8% for this year, with tariffs accounting for nearly half the reduction. China’s growth forecast has been cut to 4%, reflecting weaker external demand. The eurozone faces a more modest reduction to 0.8%, with stronger fiscal stimulus providing some offset.

Source: IMF

Global trade growth is expected to decline more severely than output, dropping to just 1.7% in 2025. 

The report presents several forecast scenarios reflecting differing policy paths. A pre-April 2 forecast (excluding the most recent tariff escalation) would have yielded 3.2% global growth in both 2025 and 2026. A model-based forecast incorporating announcements after 9 April suggests that even with temporary halts to some tariffs, global growth prospects remain similar to the reference forecast due to elevated US-China tariffs and continued uncertainty.

Despite the slowdown, global growth remains above recession levels. The IMF recommends restoring trade policy stability and forging mutually beneficial arrangements to address longstanding gaps in international trading rules. 

Domestic imbalances contribute to uneven growth, with high consumption in the US, weak demand in China, and subdued manufacturing activity in many economies. Addressing these underlying issues could help offset economic risks and close external imbalances whilst building a more inclusive trading system.

Interestingly, the IMF’s inflation forecast has been relatively stable. Emerging and developing markets in Asia, in particular, are expected to see more muted inflationary pressures. Yet this outcome is a likely result of the negative demand shock which tariffed countries are experiencing as export demand diminishes. Furthermore, rising import prices from a trade war could increase already tentative inflationary pressures.

In this vein, the IMF notes that since over 80% of trade invoicing is conducted in US dollars, this projection could be reversed if the USD appreciated. 

Source: IMF

To doubt is to waver

Trade policy uncertainty has become a major impediment to economic growth, with the prolonged elevation of this uncertainty causing investment distortions and market volatility. 

Trade uncertainty, the IMF emphasises, weighs adversely on supply- and demand-side indicators, creating a cycle of negative wealth effects. 

The impact of this trade uncertainty manifests in financial market volatility, supply chain disruptions, and dampened investment.

To mitigate these impacts, the IMF recommends international cooperation through regional and cross-regional groups to sustain global growth and tackle common problems. It suggests that a stable and predictable trade environment could be achieved through pragmatic cooperation and deeper economic integration, including non-discriminatory unilateral reductions of trade barriers or expanded trade at regional, plurilateral, or multilateral levels.

The IMF also cautions against broad subsidies as a response to trade distortions, noting they generate large fiscal costs and additional distortions. While targeted industrial policies may alleviate specific sectoral market failures in certain cases, they should be subjected to a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis and narrowly focused on well-identified market failures to minimise distortions.

Reducing policy-induced uncertainty would at least go some way in working against the bubble of uncertainty which global trade currently doesn’t seem capable of bursting.

“Power hungry”: The impact on commodity markets

The future of commodities markets appears to be characterised by this same increasing volatility and changing dynamics across different sectors, as geopolitics and technology developments prove a double-edged sword: but also pose room for opportunity. 

The report highlights some key metrics influencing their conclusion:

• In energy, oil prices declined 9.7% between August 2024 and March 2025, with further plummets in early April amid escalating trade tensions.
• Natural gas prices rose until March 2025 but reversed course in April, with futures suggesting declining prices through 2030.

• The IMF’s metals price index increased by 11.2% between August 2024 and March 2025, driven mainly by gold, aluminium, and copper.
• Gold prices have repeatedly set new records amid policy and geopolitical uncertainty, hitting $3,500 today.

• The IMF’s food and beverages price index increased by 3.6%, driven by higher beverage prices.
• Coffee prices jumped 33.8%, reaching historic highs due to weather-related supply concerns; on the flip side, rice prices fell 26.0% as crop conditions improved in India and other parts of Asia.

Trade war fears are adding to the “already-bearish outlook” in these markets, and a major structural shift is occurring with AI-related data centres dramatically increasing electricity demand. By 2030, AI-driven global electricity consumption could reach 1,500 TWh, comparable to India’s current total electricity consumption.

The future outlook appears to be one of continued volatility, with balanced risks for energy markets but significant structural changes due to technological developments like AI, which will reshape energy demand patterns and potentially impact all commodity markets through their effects on economic growth and costs.

—

The report comes as many world economies seek to reroute supply chains, creating an environment in which decades-old alliances are being rethought. The IMF report has forecasted relatively more stable economic growth, which fell just 0.3% to 6.2% in 2025; yet US Vice President JD Vance’s recent visit to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has highlighted the paradoxicality of cutting China out while relying on their materials for manufacturing.

This, and similar contradictions, are what has led the IMF to call for “prudence and improved collaboration” across industries and national boundaries. Fiscal authorities face particularly difficult choices amid high debt levels, rising financial costs, and new spending demands, including increased defence expenditure in some regions. 

The IMF highlights that the global economy needs a “clear and predictable trading system, addressing longstanding gaps in international trading rules, including the pervasive use of non-tariff barriers or other trade-distorting measures.” Countries must remain agile to stay afloat.

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The WTO’s Global Trade Outlook for April 2025, published on Wednesday, 16 April, presents a grim view of international trade, one marred by reciprocal tariffs and fears of a worldwide trade war.

In its first report since Trump’s broad-ranging tariffs came into effect, the WTO revised its estimates of global trade volumes, forecasting they would fall by 0.2% in 2025 and pick up slightly in 2026, rising by 2.5%. In the October report, trade volumes were predicted to rise by 3% in 2025 after a strong 2.7% growth in 2024.

A forecasted 1.7% reduction in North American trade is largely responsible for the shift, while merchandise trade is expected to keep rising, albeit less than previous estimates, in the rest of the world. The most marked decrease is expected to be in Asian trade, now forecasted to only grow by 0.6% compared to the impressive 7.4% growth projected in the October report. 

This comes as tariffs imposed by the Trump administration come into effect all over the world; while many of the headline-making country-specific tariffs have been halted for 90 days, the 10% baseline tariff remains for all exports to the US. Nevertheless, the trade uncertainty caused by the tariff announcements and fears of further tariffs on specific industries, like pharmaceuticals or metals, is responsible for the “significant reversal” in estimates, said the WTO. 

US tariffs on China, the only ones not subject to the 90-day delay, currently stand at 145%, with a 125% reciprocal tariff levied by China on US goods. This is expected to lead to a sharp fall in US imports from China, creating opportunities for suppliers from emerging economies to fill the gap. Similarly, Chinese exports to all regions except North America are expected to rise by as much as 9% as goods are redirected outside the US.

If the currently suspended tariffs were to come into effect, they would lead to a further reduction of 0.6% in global trade, with emerging economies bearing the brunt of the effect. A rise in trade policy uncertainty, for example if more countries enacted reciprocal tariffs against the US, could lead to a further 0.8% decline, for a total of -1.5% trade growth in 2025.

The report marks the first time the WTO measures trade in services, a growing but oft-overlooked sector in global trade. Services trade is expected to grow significantly in 2025, but tariff-related uncertainty and a decrease in global trade will see it rise by just 4%, more than a percentage point below pre-tariff estimates. 

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With more details being released by the US and some countries already releasing significant retaliatory tariffs, a clearer picture is emerging – one of a global economy which will be, at least for a short while, deeply affected by the sweeping tariff regime. Changes and adjustments resulting from this are expected to have far-reaching effects on the global trade industry, diverting trade flows and transforming supply chains. 

When Asian markets opened this morning, it was clear their adjustment to Trump’s tariffs was far from over. Japan’s Nikkei lost 7.8% and China’s main index, the Shanghai composite, lost 7.3%, the biggest fall since the 2020 pandemic. Hong Kong’s Hang Sei index had the biggest one-day drop in 28 years, closing at -13.2%. On the other hand, Asian currencies may see a resurgence as investors move away from the dollar and towards “safe havens” like the Japanese yen, Swiss franc, and Euro, all of which have risen in the past few days. 

Many Asian countries have been among the hardest-hit by Trump’s tariffs, with China subject to a staggering total 54% tariff. The US is by far China’s biggest trading partner, and the recently announced 34% retaliatory tariff is expected to hit US exporters hard when it goes into effect on 10 April. 

The two most important Indian stock indexes fell by around 5% on opening, likely in response to the 26% tariffs imposed by the US. This was in part driven by Tata motors, one of the largest Indian auto companies, which fell by over 10%. Jaguar Land Rover, one of its subsidiaries, was the first major company to announce it would halt shipments of its UK-made cars to the US due to the tariffs levied on the global auto industry. 

Amid fears of a US recession – which analysts like Goldman Sachs are now forecasting with near-certainty if all the tariffs go into effect as announced – oil prices have also dropped to a 4-year low. Brent crude, the benchmail oil marker, has continued its fall started on Friday, now costing $63.49 a barrel compared to last year’s average of about $80. 

European markets, which opened just a few hours ago, are experiencing similar shockwaves. While the UK has been widely seen as avoiding the worst of the tariffs, only being subject to the baseline 10% tariff levied against all countries (even uninhabited Antarctic islands), London’s FTSE 100 lost 4.9%. The German stock exchange fell by 10% when markets opened but has now recovered to just -5.9%, while the French Cac 40 fell by 5.7%.

This is as EU members grapple with high tariffs of 20% as well as a 25% tariff on foreign cars set to go into effect soon, which is expected to affect the already struggling German auto industry. Companies with complex supply chains, like car manufacturers, could see an exponential effect of tariffs, especially if an intermediate step of the manufacturing process happens in the US. 

The agricultural industry, too, could experience significant turbulency, as some of the countries most affected by the tariffs, such as Vietnam and Taiwan, are also among the world’s biggest coffee, cocoa, and crop exporters. This could have a ripple effect both in consumer purchasing power and in global supply chains – for example, strengthening trade between the US and Brazil, another big coffee producer that has been hit less by the tariffs. 

As companies look into diverting their supply chains, smaller players might unexpectedly come at the forefront of global trade. San Marino, a small city-state on the Adriatic coast of Italy, has been eyed as a way for some EU countries to evade US tariffs, which are 20% on the EU but only 10% on San Marino. 

It’s still hard to tell just how much the tariffs will impact the global economy, and how – as seen by the volatile response of markets to the changes. Retaliatory tariffs on the one hand could exacerbate the situation and lead to an all-out global trade war, while negotiation attempts could de-escalate current tensions and lead to a much softer impact on the global economy.

The post Markets react to Liberation Day tariffs as global trade hangs in the balance appeared first on Trade Finance Global.

After months of starts and stops, threats and retreats, Liberation Day is upon us. The Trump administration’s promised wide-ranging regime of tariffs, a cornerstone of his winning presidential campaign, was set for 2 April. Some countries scrambled to negotiate last-minute deals while others are searching for ways to restructure their supply chains – often by moving closer to the US’ s rivals – all in the wake of what is anticipated to be the biggest unilateral tariff escalation since the 1950s Cuban embargo. 

Amidst the confusion and ever-changing policies, the TFG team has compiled a summary of the story thus far and the tariffs as they stand now – updated live every day.

How did we get here?

Throughout the US presidential campaign last year, trade and tariffs have been at the forefront of Republican messaging, forming a core part of Trump’s plan to revive the US economy. While blanket tariffs – of as much as 60% on US rivals like China – were memorably floated during rallies and speeches, more recent declarations by the Trump administration have focused around so-called “reciprocal” tariffs. 

These unilateral import taxes are meant to “make up for” trade barriers that (the President believes) are being unfairly levied against the US, in the form of taxes, subsidies, regulation, and red tape. This seems to suggest that tariffs will vary wildly between countries and even from one industry to the next depending on their importance to US trade and the level of trade barriers. That the tariffs are, at least, in part, targeted towards ending “unfair practices that have been ripping off [the US] for decades” suggests that negotiation is possible, and proposed tariffs may be reduced or lifted if receiving countries make concessions on US exports. 

Tariff timeline

1 February – Trump announces tariffs on Canada and Mexico

In a series of executive orders, Trump imposed a 25% tariff on nearly all goods from Canada and Mexico, scheduled to come into effect on 4 February. Canadian oil and energy imports would have been exempt from this, instead only being taxed at 10%. In the same set of orders, Chinese imports are set to be subject to a 10% tariff on top of currently existing taxes. 

3 February – Trump delays tariffs after retaliation threats

The day before the 25% tariff was set to begin, the Trump administration reached a deal with Canada and Mexico’s leaders to delay them by a month after the two countries threatened strong retaliatory taxes on American exports. 

4 March – Canada and Mexico tariffs really do come into effect

A month after the tariffs were meant to begin, US tariffs against Canada and Mexico came into effect, as did Canada’s retaliatory levies. The White House also announces a doubling of blanket tariffs on Chinese goods, from 10% to 20%, set to start the following day. 

6 March – Trump delays (some) tariffs, again

Just two days after the US–Canada–Mexico tariffs come into effect, the US once again delays tariffs on about half of goods – those covered by the USMCA free trade treaty – by another few weeks. The full set of tariffs are now scheduled to go into effect on 2 April. 

2 April – Liberation Day

Most tariffs on all industries and all areas of the world are expected to be announced, and some even to go into effect, today. This is likely to affect even countries that have already been affected by some tariffs and those who have long-standing trade agreements with the US. It is also the day that the USMCA exemption, which lifted tariffs on many Canadian and Mexican goods, will run out, leaving the US’s two main trading partners facing steep tariffs that may not be delayed again. 

3 April – Auto tariffs

Proposed tariffs specifically targeting passenger cars and trucks from any country, speculated to be as high as 25%, are set to go into effect on 3 April. 

3 May – Deadline for tariffs on auto parts

According to the same executive order that imposed tariffs on cars, a 25% tariff on auto parts will go into effect before 3 May. 

TFG Tariff Tracker

As information about the new tariffs is released throughout the day, the TFG team will keep updating the timeline and publish summaries of which industries and areas are being most affected. 

The post TFG Tariff Tracker: What’s in store for Liberation Day? appeared first on Trade Finance Global.

Investment giant BlackRock’s plans to buy the Panama Canal, likely motivated by US President Donald Trump’s insistence on restoring the crucial trade route to US control, look set to encounter pushback from the Panamanian government. 

Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino said on Wednesday 5 March that Trump was “lying” about the US reclaiming the canal, which Mulino said “is Panamanian and will continue to be Panamanian.” On Friday, Panama announced its Maritime Authority, which is responsible for oversight of Panama’s port infrastructure, would request all legal and financial documents involved in the sale of two key ports on either end of the Canal to a group of investors backed by the US asset management firm. 

In the first months of his presidency, Trump has made aggressive foreign policy a centrepiece, with bids to increase US involvement in Gaza, buy Greenland, and a much-rebuffed plan to take over Canada. Trump has also been increasingly vocal about taking back the Panama Canal, which the US built but ceded to the Panamanian government in 1999. 

The waterway is now run by the Panama Canal Authority (AMP), an independent entity whose board is appointed by the government. In his State of the Union speech, Trump said the US was “taking back” the canal, accusing the Panamanian government of having “essentially given it, ceded it, to China”. While the canal itself is under AMP control, the key ports of Cristobal and Balboa, at either end of the waterway, are operated by Hong Kong firm CK Hutchinson under a 25-year concession. The two ports regulate access to the canal from the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, respectively, acting as crucial logistics points for goods between the US, Latin America, and the rest of the world. 

The sale, which has not been finalised yet, would see CK Hutchinson hand over an 80% stake in the two ports, as well as 41 other ports across 23 countries, to US investment giant BlackRock for £17.8 billion. Frank Sixt, co-Managing Director of CK Hutchinson, said in a statement that “the transaction is purely commercial in nature and wholly unrelated to recent political news reports concerning the Panama Ports”. However, Bloomberg reported that Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, pitched his plans to Trump on the phone before finalising the deal. 

The canal is one of the world’s busiest shipping routes, handling 5% of global maritime trade and 40% of all US container traffic. The waterway looks set to become even more crucial as trade routes shift: proposed sanctions to Mexico and Canada could see an increase in maritime trade to the US, increasing traffic in a canal that already sees over 14,000 ships pass through it a year. 

Government opposition, however, could slow or even halt BlackRock’s acquisition: the transaction must be approved by the government, which has been publicly critical of plans to cede control to the US.

This may in part be motivated by Trump’s stated intentions to force authorities to stop charging US companies for transit. Panama’s economy rests heavily on the canal, which accounts for almost a quarter of the country’s GDP, and 70% of ships passing through the waterway are bound for the US. 

On the other hand, a new administration under US control could drive investment to the ports, increasing efficiency and reducing delays. While less vulnerable to recent shocks than other global shipping hubs, the Panama Canal has seen disruptions due to cyclone-driven droughts and geopolitical risk, leading Maersk to temporarily reroute some of its goods to rail freight last year. A more modern and resilient canal could bode well for global trade, but disruptions caused by US-Panama tensions place a key trade route at more risk than usual.

The post Panama’s government pushes back against Trump-backed BlackRock acquisition of Panama Canal ports appeared first on Trade Finance Global.

• Trump’s return to presidential office promises to challenge regulatory structures.
• Beyond the US, payment regulation is aimed at making payments cheaper, faster, and more innovative.
• The SWIFT ISO 20022 compliance deadline in November 2025 will require banks and corporate treasuries to update systems.

Without a doubt, the regulatory landscape for the year ahead is set to be demanding, with key developments including Swift’s ISO 20022 compliance deadline in November, evolving AI regulation, and the European Union’s (EU) latest updates to payment frameworks through PSD3 and the Instant Payments Regulation. Amid tightening compliance pressures, financial crime also remains a growing concern, adding to the complexity for businesses navigating these shifts.

Apologies to readers for the pun in the headline, but it was there for the taking! After all, the regulatory outlook for the remainder of the year has been much debated as US President Trump returned for his second term, promising trade tariffs and a bonfire of regulations – with many going straight in the bin. 

Interestingly, Bank of England officials in the UK have pushed back implementation of the new Basel 3.1 capital adequacy regime until 2027, as they await clarity on the US approach to capital controls now that Trump is in office. The EU is probably fearful that a regulatory and risk gap may open up between what banks can invest, and in what regions, against their capital bases if a universal adoption of the global regime isn’t followed. 

The down-the-line impact on corporate treasuries if more capital is available for mergers and acquisitions (M&A), loans, corporate bonds and so on – not to mention the inflationary potential of a possible boom on US financial markets in the event of any relaxation – is still to be seen in these early days of the new presidency. 

But one thing is certain: the regulatory outlook will change with Trump in charge. As an example, the green finance and ESG arena have already been hit as he signed an executive order to pull out of the Paris climate mitigation agreement for a second time upon his ascension. DEI also looks to be in trouble. Within days of taking office, Trump moved to scale back DEI initiatives across the federal government and federal contractors, with parts of the private sector following suit.

A regulatory freeze was another executive order signed to stop US Federal agencies from issuing any new rules until Trump has full control of the government, amidst promises of a bonfire of regulations – or at the very least a policy whereby old ones have to go if new ones are enacted. This is an effort to cut down on red tape.      

Capital adequacy confusion

“Personally, I don’t think there is enough water under the bridge since the 2008 crash and the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Credit Suisse in 2023 to tinker with the global Basel III capital adequacy rules,” said Royston Da Costa, Assistant Treasurer at Ferguson, a multinational value-added plumbing and heating product distributor. 

“The collapses of SVB and Credit Suisse reminded people what a failed bank can look like and of its potentially disastrous impact on corporate payment, investment and supply chains around the world. It was only averted in these cases thanks to government action.”   

“It must be remembered that Trump has made a number of statements in relation to any future trade or policy talks with rival nations. However, we have to wait and see what the actual outcome will be,” added DaCosta. 

“I don’t want to comment about any of Trump’s mooted 25% tariffs against China and others [at the time of interviewing, no such charges on imports to the US had yet been applied]. Ditto with his comments about the US taking over Greenland from Denmark in a geopolitical move designed to stymie any undue Russian or Chinese influence over North Pole trade routes and natural resources.” 

“But I do advise my peers to actually look at the detail, not the rhetoric of Trump to see what actually results,” he continued. “2026 is also generally expected to be a good year for economic growth in the US once the new government settles in, and we get through this year.” The huge investment released by the now defunct Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) will continue to impact the growth potential of the US economy as well – and, by extension, the world. As ever, if the US grows it helps the UK, Europe and the rest of the world to grow.   

Patrick Kunz, Managing Director, Pecunia Treasury & Finance and Founder of the Treasury Masterminds network, is in agreement that President Trump sees the world “very pragmatically” and in a transactional way. 

He is also aware the dollar (USD) needs to remain the world’s reserve currency. “Trump will protect that position,” said Kunz, adding that nevertheless: “US business and consumers need to thrive – and if that means introducing or increasing tariffs for foreign products or companies, then I believe he will do that despite any risk.”  

But, what Trump often forgets is that some regulations are hard to change or implement, at least in a short four-year term of office that goes very quickly. “Some of his envisaged changes might even be illegal, or at least subject to legal challenge, such as ideas around restricting the rights of US-born people to automatic citizenship and changing the US labour market that way. He also seems to have a lot of priorities, so not all of his grand plans will necessarily become reality – purely due to the vast scope of them and his limited time in office.”     

Kunz added, “I guess in the short-term we’ll see more protectionism and a stronger USD. Mid- to long-term the situation will stabilise and normalise, as it always does.” 

Elsewhere, Kunz believes the same principle applies on the non-Trump general global regulatory front as well. “Regulation always settles in eventually and becomes the ‘new norm’. Its driving factors come from several sources, but most noticeably regulations are enacted to deliver: 

• Protection
• Control
• Or enforcement

“The EU Instant Payments Regulation (IPR) promised us a lot for instance. But European banks are too slow or reluctant to implement it (as it costs them money), so they have needed to be forced. The latter enforcement regulatory driver applies here, although the drivers do often overlap somewhat,” he noted.

“The EU’s EMIR, MiFID and MMF reform agenda comes from a protection aspect. Avoiding a crisis in the financial markets is the paramount driver here. This is very difficult though as financial markets nowadays are very global, interconnected and react much faster to movements than was previously the case. For example, we saw Credit Suisse go down in a matter of days only recently.” 

Can more rules and regulations avoid that scenario fully in future? Kunz doubts it. “Usually, new regulations only create extra burdens on investment banking and corporate treasuries. We find ways around them concerning controls, tax or whatever it is – or a new product comes along with new and different risks.” The rise of ETFs after the 2008 crash is an example of this.       

PSD3 and IPR changing EU payments 

As Kunz alluded to, the third iteration of the EU’s Payment Services Directive (PSD3), which incorporates the IPR, is on its way. This requires payment service providers (PSPs) in the euro area to charge the same or lower fees for instant payments as they do for regular transfers is a gamechanger. The same stipulation applies to PSPs outside the euro area by 2027, offering corporates’ faster payments at a cheaper fee. 

As Gareth Lodge, Principal Analyst, Celent, noted, “While many countries in Europe have had forms of instant payments for years, the EU Instant Payment Regulation is designed to deliver the same universal experience as the single euro payments area (SEPA) across the entire continent. Universal acceptance and consistent rules and experience for all users offer clear benefits. 2025 will see which banks pull away from the pack as they embrace the opportunities that instant payments can bring.”  

As a brief aside, Lodge also noted that European initiatives such as EPI and Wero are going mainstream. “The European Payments Initiative (EPI), previously known as the Pan-European Payments System Initiative is a unified digital payment service backed by 16 European banks and PSPs. Its aim is to allow European consumers and merchants to make next-generation payments for all types of person-to-person (P2P) transfers and retail transactions via a digital wallet, called Wero. Wero is based on instant account-to-account (A2A) payments, catered for under SEPA, and will eliminate intermediaries in the payment chain and associated costs.

All of this means a lot of change in the European payments landscape. But hopefully in a beneficial way (once the pain of transition is over), certainly for corporate treasurers at least.

More generally, the over-arching PSD3 will also encourage more access and data sharing by further encouraging the adoption of open application programming interfaces (APIs) as a means of connectivity and easier data exchange. This should open up the payments marketplace to more new entrants, competition, and hopefully, cheaper pricing via the use of open banking and finance techniques – continent-wide aggregated payment processing is one possible end-use. 

The rise of open APIs is a technology trend mirrored in China, the US, and indeed globally with differing regulatory approaches to it. The technology trend forces change in and of itself. Whether regulators want to control it is another matter, but some kind of rules are necessary to ensure resiliency, privacy, anti-fraud and other measures are applied.     

“PSD3 will be good,” commented Kunz, “as it acknowledges the fact that banks are not monopolists for payments anymore in a fintech-enhanced environment. It also acts as a further EU spur to open and speed up information sharing and connectivity in financial services (FS) via the encouragement of more open API usage. This is welcome.”     

“But the EU does need to be mindful of ‘over-regulation’. The EU might be able to regulate harsher than other jurisdictions in payment and other sectors, but that could limit its innovative capacity and harm the growth of certain fintechs. We already see the EU lagging behind in this area.” 

“All the present big fintechs in the payments arena either come from Asia or the US, almost none are from the EU, with only a few exceptions. Getting the balance right between regulating and letting technology rip to evolve markets is always an issue.”    

“Throughout the remainder of 2025, I will be excited to see this battle between innovation and regulation in action,” said Kunz. Certain regulations can ‘force’ innovation (in instant payments or open API access for instance). But other rules may come from a protectionary standpoint and could therefore potentially harm innovation. Getting the balance right in the EU is crucial. Even if the idea comes from a good place innovation may shift to a less regulated market if it isn’t done well.”   

Anti-fraud initiatives  

Despite the potential downsides, the enhanced consumer protection and fraud detection measures in PSD3 via better Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) procedures is welcome – according to Kunz. He pointed to the rising tide of financial crime and fraud levels that we’ve since in recent years as a concern. Sanction compliance has also become a bigger concern for treasurers in an increasingly unstable geopolitical world.  

The Verification of Payee (VoP) service under the IPR is useful in the fight against crime, alongside strengthened SCA under the over-arching PSD3 regulation in Europe. Knowing who beneficiaries are beforehand is very important in the context of instant payments. Trying to prevent rising levels of fraud in the diminishing amount of transaction time available to financial institutions (FIs) in a real-time payment world isn’t easy, so anything that can help is welcome. 

The pan-European Fraud Pattern and Anomaly Detection (FPAD) solution from EBA Clearing is also of great interest in this area, as it seeks to deliver anonymised data, to comply with privacy stipulations, in a federated data solution that is dedicated to stopping fraud and financial crime by identifying suspicious activity faster with AI technology mining the data. After all, criminals share information on the dark web, so why shouldn’t FIs share information in the fight against them? A common anti-fraud taxonomy is being developed by the 50+ FPAD users in Europe and this should ultimately benefit end users such as corporate treasurers.

Swift is seeking to replicate this anti-fraud effort on a global scale. It has also deployed a federated data and AI investigate tool this year. The new Swift AI-powered anomaly detection service will be able to draw on the billions of transactions that flow over the Swift network to better identify and flag suspicious transactions. Banks can then take appropriate action in real time to stop fraud. It’s a case of using shared data and AI’s ability to spot suspicious activity to fight back against criminals, who themselves are increasingly using AI.  

Spotlight on artificial intelligence 

The emerging artificial intelligence area is a case in point when trying to ‘get the balance right’ between innovation and oversight. The EU has its AI Act, for example, which is the first-ever legal framework on AI. It could act as a global template for others to follow if they don’t want to just let the technology rip and aren’t concerned about governance issues. 

The EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) lays down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence, providing AI developers and deployers with clear requirements and obligations regarding specific uses. At the same time, however, the regulation seeks to reduce administrative and financial burdens for businesses, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to encourage uptake of this useful nascent technology. Getting the balance right, while still ensuring an AI tool doesn’t go off script is the challenge.  

The AI Act is part of a wider EU package of policy measures to support the development of trustworthy AI, which also includes the AI Innovation Package and the Coordinated Plan on AI. Together, these measures seek to guarantee the safety and fundamental rights of people and businesses, while strengthening uptake, investment and innovation in AI across the EU. 

However, there is no doubt China and Asia already have a lead in this AI field and that Trump is targeting it too, so the EU will have to be careful it doesn’t scare AI investors away. The US’ $500 billion Stargate joint venture Initiative recently announced to fund the country’s future infrastructure for AI is a clear statement of intent that it wants to dominate the emerging AI field that will likely come to dominate 21st-century economics. 

China’s launch of the open source-enabled DeepSeek AI in January 2025 shows that it is serious too. The advent of DeepSeek, which so impacted US tech company stock prices and global financial markets in January 2025, could open up a space for Europe to enter the AI race in the future, as the entry stakes just got a lot cheaper. 

Theoretically, others could run their own AI models based on the DeepSeek model – and without the specific Chinese political restrictions applied. As such, the AI field, its regulation vis-à-vis geopolitical tensions, and future end-use just became very interesting. 

“I think the AI Act is diligent and well-meant regulation, but overly protective,” noted Kunz. “It will make the EU much less competitive for AI or tech-related initiatives. Founders will just go to the US or China to build there, as it is much easier. We already see this happening. China is massively ahead of Europe on AI and technology usage already in business and in daily life.”    

“So far AI in treasury has not been revolutionary because it’s often merely an extension of established Machine Learning (ML) techniques, automation, or data analytics end uses,” said Kunz. “However, it is only a matter of time until this changes, and treasury is more directly impacted by AI than it is at present. 

“The technology will bring bigger use cases in future in both information management and cashflow predictions very very soon. Not only will AI be deployed in cash flow forecasting (CFF) but also in heavy information processing procedures involving trade finance or securitisation programmes. AI can additionally help in better debt management. Asking a ChatGPT tool to find relevant clauses for a certain action to take in a 500+ page loan documentation can save loads of time, for example, and enhance efficiency.”   

ISO 20022 messaging 

Returning to the payments arena, but this time from an Asian and global perspective, Yvonne Yiu, Co-Head of Global Payments Solutions, Asia Pacific at HSBC, is focused on the Swift deadline for November 2025 this year, when all banks on its platform must use the more data-rich ISO 20022 messaging standard, which relies on the XML coding language if they want to access its global interbank payment network. 

The Swift ISO 20022 migration will see the end of its old MT messaging series. More character space on ISO 20022 enables more end uses and extra efficient payment processes for everyone in a financial supply chain, including treasurers. Many of the bigger banks have already moved to the standard – and are aiming to bring corporate clients along with them.

Yiu is pleased that HSBC has already enabled its global network of more than 50 markets to receive and forward SWIFT CBPR+ (ISO 20022-enabled) messages. Ditto the newly migrated domestic markets that can exchange ISO messaging. Indeed, HSBC has embarked on a multi-year project and will introduce changes to its online digital channels and further updates to its various payment file formats to not only meet these requirements but ensure fast benefits, justifying its investment. 

But smaller banks and others, including corporate treasuries themselves, must also migrate to ISO 20022 as well in order to get the full industry-wide benefits, without undue reliance on vendor-supplied converter tools.   

“We’ve been encouraging clients across our global network to proactively assess their readiness for ISO 20022,” said Yiu. “This is so that they can fully leverage the enriched and structured payment data to achieve improved transparency and accuracy.” 

“A crucial step on this journey is collaborating with ERP and TMS providers to determine the necessary changes and upgrades,” continued Yiu. “These changes may include accommodating new data requirements, such as debtor addresses and ultimate creditor details, in order to meet changing industry standards.”    

“Adopting ISO 20022 is not just about compliance,” added Yiu. “It’s also a transformative opportunity for the payments industry. By embracing ISO 20022, organisations can unlock significant efficiencies and greatly improve their operational capabilities.  We are committed to partnering with our clients throughout this journey, sharing expertise and providing support to ensure a seamless transition.”  

Celent’s Lodge is in agreement that 2025 is a pivotal year for ISO 20022, with deadlines for the US FedWire service imminent alongside the Swift MT migration, which will finally complete this year after much frustration among treasurers. 

“As with any complex migration, it will always be a challenge for everyone to be 100% ready by the Swift November 2025 deadline,” admitted Lodge. “By then, all payment messages sent or received through the Swift network must be based on ISO 20022 to encourage universal adoption and access to the more charter and data-rich XML-based standard. There have been herculean efforts by many so far, yet arguably the hard work actually starts next year.” 

2026 is when banks need to ensure they double down on their efforts to maximise the benefits that ISO 20022 investment can bring – not just for themselves but for treasury functions, too.

Standing on shifting sands

All this change – within Europe and without – will take shape in 2025 and alter the future of payments, trade, ESG, and beyond.  Potential trade wars are another thing to watch in what could be a volatile year.  

For corporate treasurers, navigating the remainder of the year will require both pragmatism and adaptability. Regulatory shifts, geopolitical uncertainty, and technological advancements are converging to reshape the financial landscape. The balancing act between compliance and innovation will be crucial, not only in Europe but across the globe.

One certainty amid all the uncertainty is that treasurers will need to engage more actively with their regulatory environments. Whether it’s leveraging real-time payments, harnessing AI’s potential, or ensuring seamless ISO 20022 adoption, those who anticipate the impact of regulatory change rather than merely react to it will be the best placed.

Yet, if history is any guide, regulation rarely moves in a straight line. Loopholes emerge, unintended consequences surface, and markets adjust in unexpected ways. Perhaps the real question, then, isn’t whether treasurers will ‘come up trumps’ in 2025, but whether they will be agile enough to play the hand they’re dealt.

The post Will treasurers come up Trumps? Top regulations to watch in 2025 appeared first on Trade Finance Global.

It’s been a long few weeks since Donald Trump began his second presidential term on 20 January. Trade observers braced themselves for a flurry of trade actions. The question, as always with Trump, was what would stick. 

Sure enough, Trump quickly slapped duties on imports from Colombia, Canada, and Mexico, only to withdraw them after these countries’ governments granted minor concessions. There was also a move to annual an exemption on imports under $800 – the so-called de minimis rule – that was later cancelled. (It’s certainly an issue: Since Covid, Chinese retailers like Temu have taken advantage of de minimis to ship over 1.3 billion small packages to the U.S. tariff-free.) 

At this writing, here’s what is sticking: a 10% tariff on all shipments from China, and now a 25% tariff on all steel and aluminium imports. Other taxes may follow, but that’s the first volley. Those duties are significant. The US imported $438.9 billion of goods and commodities from China in 2024, and exported $134.6 billion to the Asia nation, for a trade deficit of $295.4 billion, according to Trade Data Monitor (TDM). Theoretically, that means the US is poised to collect $43.9 billion in duties, but tariffs of course reduce imports. Chinese exporters are already hunting alternative markets, especially in Asia. 

Fortress America 

As the world’s top consumer market, the US has leverage in controlling access to its markets, and many of its outsourcing manufacturers now seek countries to replace China and other targets for tariffs on more favourable terms. The US’s top source of imports is now Mexico, followed by China and Canada; the list goes on with Germany, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Ireland, and India. 

Ireland is an interesting case: it’s the US’s top supplier of pharmaceuticals, shipping in $42.8 billion worth in the first 10 months of 2024. It’s hard to imagine Washington slapping tariffs on a product as politically sensitive as pharmaceuticals. In other words, there’ll still be pie to go around. 

Thus far, however, the focus has been on industrial goods. In 2024, the US imported $31.4 billion in iron and steel, and the three top suppliers were Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. The US imported $27.4 billion in aluminium in 2024. The top three aluminium partners in 2024 were Canada, China, and Mexico. In practice, this means the US is targeting automotive supply chains that now span both American continents. 

The likely repercussions will be on Made in America cars, as prices are forced up. The US imported $216.8 billion in motor vehicles in 2024, and the top five suppliers were Mexico, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and Germany.  

Higher costs for American cars

The higher costs the US is imposing on its automotive supply chains will help competitors, notably Germany. Although Germany’s export economy has hit some headwinds, with exports slightly down in 2024, it’s still the globe’s dominant auto exporter. In the first three quarters of 2024, German auto exports increased 18.8% to $132.7 billion. 

Meanwhile, Japan’s car exports rose 10.2% to $77.8 billion, while China’s shipments nudged up 4.8% to $67.6 billion. In the electric car sector, two countries by far dominate global trade: Germany shipped out$29.1 billion in the first nine months of 2024, down 4.7% year-on-year,  while China exported $25.4 billion, up 1.4%. That’s followed by South Korea, Mexico, Japan, and the US.

Source: Trade Data Monitor

The resilience of global trade

To be sure, the scale of global trade is such that, even if government adopts protectionist measures en masse, it’s unlikely to collapse. Total exports in 2024 are expected to be around $25 trillion. The logistics sector alone is worth over $10 trillion. Global trade isn’t going anywhere. The World Trade Organization (WTO) reports that total trade in goods should increase by 2.7% in 2025, and by a few more percentage points if the ongoing conflict in the Middle East is contained. In the first 10 months of 2024, the US, the world’s top import market, ramped up imports by 5% to $2.7 trillion.

The problem of Chinese demand

An issue that could upend geopolitics – with unintended consequences that will affect war and peace, migration, and supply chains, amongst other big issues – just as much is what appears to be a crumbling in Chinese domestic demand. In a time of geopolitical shifting and adjustments, it’s one of the key factors to watch. Luckily, many of China’s neighbours have been on a newfound path to prosperity. The dream of an open and inviting Chinese market for Western businesses might have withered, but other Asian markets are just as impressive as they are overlooked. 

They’ve also benefited from globalisation to expand their middle classes. Many of the fastest-growing import markets in the world are in Asia. Take Malaysia: in the first ten months of 2024, Malaysia increased imports by 13.2% to $248.5 billion. Or Thailand, where imports increased 6.7% to $259.6 billion. And most of their trading partners are also in Asia. That’s why the WTO expects Asian export volumes to increase by as much as 7.4% in 2024; in Europe, by contrast, exports are expected to contract by 1.4%, the WTO said. 

High-tech trade remains strong 

There is less merchandise trade than there used to be, partly because there’s more service and digital trade. But you can’t have digital or service trade unless you have silicon chips. And chips trade is now the key strategic vector. Not only is Taiwan the world’s top chip exporter, but it also China’s top supplier of electronics and electrical parts (such as chips). In the first 10 months of 2024, China imported $157.7 billion worth of electronics and parts from Taiwan, up 11.1% from the same period in 2023. The position of Taiwan as the centre of global high-tech trade complicates its relationship with Beijing. 

The rise of populist governments around the world is sure to deflate the move toward green energy products. Total imports of solar panels and related parts shrank 13.3% to $135.3 billion in the first nine months of 2024. China is the world’s number one buyer, importing $19.9 billion, followed closely by the US, Germany, the Netherlands, and India. But the upcoming election in Germany, and still new governments in the US and India, make nothing certain.

The post TDM economic insight: New US tariffs focus on auto supply chains appeared first on Trade Finance Global.

• US President Donald Trump has announced a 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico, to which Canada has retaliated with a 25% tariff.
• The US has also placed a 10% tariff on Chinese imports, mediating from the promised 60% figure.
• Trump has warned of similar measures for the EU.

Some speculated, and others hoped, that Donald Trump’s promises of brutal tariffs were merely an election-winning tactic to frenzy his domestic fanbase. But on 1 February 2025, less than two weeks into his presidency, it transpired that Trump was being serious. Executive orders signed on Saturday imposed a 25% tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico and a 10% levy on goods from China. These tariffs will take effect from tomorrow, 4 February.

On Sunday night, 2 February, Trump promised that tariffs on the European Union (EU) would “definitely happen” and “it’s going to be pretty soon.”

Trump posted this executive order by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which grants the president authority to regulate international commerce in response to a declared ‘national emergency’. 

IEEPA was first used by then-President Jimmy Carter in 1977, in response to the Iran hostage crisis. During his first term, Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Mexico in response to the “illegal migration crisis”, which he backed down from in June 2019, but he did use the IEEPA against Venezuela and Iran.

This time, Trump said the flow of “illegal aliens and drugs” – referring to 21,000 pounds of fentanyl apprehended by the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the last fiscal year, and “more than 10 million” illegal immigrants entering the US under Biden – constitutes a national emergency. But the sanctions are incommensurate with the crime, particularly on its northern border, through which less than 1% of illegal immigrants entered the US, and where just around 1% of the US’ fentanyl encounters take place.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has already imposed a 25% reciprocal tariff on American goods, and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, ministers across EU countries, and China have all vowed retaliation. “It’s important that we don’t divide the world with numerous tariff barriers,” said German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, promising a collective response. “[The EU is] a strong economic area and has its own courses of action.”

Trump admitted on Sunday that there may be “some pain” from his tariffs, “but […] it will all be worth the price that must be paid.” Trade wars rarely have victors, but those who suffer the most are invariably the poorest. 

The North American retaliation

Sheinbaum “categorically reject[ed]” Trump’s assertions in his IEEPA declaration, pointing out that the Mexican government has “seized more than 40 tons of drugs in four months, including 20 million doses of fentanyl”, and “arrested more than ten thousand people linked to these groups”.

Sheinbaum said, “I instruct the Secretary of Economy to implement plan B that we have been working on, which includes tariff and non-tariff measures in defence of Mexico’s interests.”

Retaliatory tariffs in the USMCA region is no new phenomenon. The softwood lumber dispute between the US and Canada lasted from 1982 to 2014, and is based on the countervailing duties (CVDs) placed by the US on imports of this wood to Canada; the British Columbia region reported the loss of nearly 10,000 jobs as a result between 2004 and 2009.

This time around, Trudeau has targeted American alcohol, fruits and vegetables, household appliances, and clothing items.

The US has decided to impose a reduced 10% tariff on Canadian energy imports, rather than the full 25% rate, designed to help limit potential increases in consumer energy costs. Despite this measure, analysts project that US consumers could still face fuel price increases of up to 50 cents per gallon. Simultaneously, the automotive industry will also likely take a hit, considering that about 50% of auto-part imports in America come from Canada and Mexico, and about 75% of American exports go to its neighbours.

Nonetheless, Canada and Mexico are heavily dependent on the US market: Canada sends 78% of its annual exports ($567 billion), and Mexico 80% ($593 billion), to the US. However, the US maintains a more diversified import portfolio – of its $3.17 trillion in annual imports, only about 14% comes from Canada and 15% from Mexico. This imbalance may give the US more flexibility in its trade options and potentially stronger negotiating power with its North American neighbours. Already, in currency markets, the Mexican peso fell by almost 3%, and the Canadian dollar hit its lowest level since 2003. 

China countermeasures

Similarly, while retaliatory tariffs are a common feature of US-China trade relations, they have never been this severe. During Trump’s first term, $370 billion worth of Chinese imports were affected by tariffs, a figure set to increase with the additional 10% rate. But this differed from the 60% he touted on the campaign trail—probably because the Chinese capacity for retaliatory tariffs poses a significant threat.

An interesting feature of Chinese retaliatory tariffs is their targetedness, as we are now seeing in Canada. In 2018, Trump announced tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminium imports from China; in response, China levied a series of 15% to 25% tariffs on agricultural imports. By 1 September 2019, the number of US agricultural tariff lines with Chinese retaliatory tariffs increased to 1,053. 

This move was strategically against American farmers (a key demographic of Trump voters). In the short run, the downward pressure on US farm incomes triggered ‘trade aid’, federal assistance for the sector. And trade networks meandered around obstacles, as China began to rely on other southern allies for agricultural products, from soybean and pork to cotton and tobacco.

China’s Imports of Agricultural Products, 2014-2018, in Nominal Billions (B) of US Dollars. Source: Congressional Research Service

Today’s macroeconomic landscape mirrors this but renders it much sharper. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a series of urbanising initiatives across the developing world, has tied the country to the fortunes of these nascent trading hubs. The South-South rerouting is underway; this time, retaliatory tariffs may even cut the US out of the equation altogether.

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Mark Carney, former Governor of both the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, warned that the proposed tariffs would hamper economic growth while stoking inflation. “They’re going to damage the US’s reputation around the world,” said Carney, who is currently among the contenders to succeed Trudeau as leader of Canada’s Liberal Party.

The UK’s Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer and Foreign Secretary David Lammy are modulating their stance to shield the UK from such measures. For now, Trump has said of Starmer that “we’re getting along very well, we’ll see whether or not we can balance out our budget”. Chris Southworth of the International Chamber of Commerce UK said on LBC Radio that the UK could serve as a “pragmatic bridge”, a broker of conversation between the US and Europe. But complacency is a weakness when dealing with someone so volatile and impulsive.

Is this just a calculated move to demonstrate resolve? If so, it’s a risky gambit that could destabilise the global economy. But the US would do well to consider how many opponents it can afford to make because if the world of trade and trade finance is anything, it is malleable.

The post The Trump tariffs begin appeared first on Trade Finance Global.