These conclusions often apply to financial institutions, which leads to reduced access to trade finance products, particularly “vanilla” trade value settlements (letters of credit and open account). Putting large banks aside, domestic players face even more constraints (i) a lack of in-depth knowledge from their existing financing partners (ii) reduced recourse to external advisory and bespoke tailor-made financing for their client base, which in turn, would increase their trade assets and optimise their consumption of fixed capital.

The increasing role of intermediaries, funds and DFIs partially aims to fulfill the gap left by sub-Saharan African financial institutions. In recent years, and perhaps more than ever, the digitalisation and move towards outsourcing for debt, hase become a significant part of the African financing ecosystem. Lack of financial capacity, long-term resources, adequate client data and letter of credit confirmation, are among the top reasons why regional financial institutions only focus on their largest importer/exporter clients. How much value could be achieved if trade loans, and risk mitigation solutions were extended market practices? Indeed, the run-of-the-mill products in commodity and trade finance still remain scarce resources for francophone financial institutions regardless of the size of the bank.In other words: we should stop focusing on big ticket wins, and look at the longer tail transactions which can help SMEs.

Deficit of industry know-how capacity

Generally speaking, trade financing in West African financial institutions focuses on LC confirmation, with international service providers few and far between. Many of those finance their trade-related assets through traditional trade lending schemes without having considered and/or been granted alternatives. Hence, the domestic risk approach does not always take into consideration the full trade cycle and all the benefits designated financing would provide. 

One of the consequences is the increased use of balance-sheet lending. As an example/case study, a Tier 2 bank in the UMOA zone, is partially financing a commodity exporter on an open account basis. A bespoke trade advance facility structure for the purposes of onlending to export-related commodities was not considered, despite volumes being eligible for such a structure. On top of new money, this would have allowed the bank to benefit from a 20 percent risk weighted assets vs a range between 50-100 percent through direct lending. Increased RWA consumption leads to less credit capacity leading to a steady trade finance gap.  

On the other hand, some tier 1 pan-African groups enjoy significant limits – sometimes not fully utilised. However, whenever international support is provided, it relates to the set-up of an Irrevocable Reimbursement Undertaking (IRU) issued by the HQ serving their smaller subsidiaries. Obviously, some country and credit risk remains high while such a structure helps address some of the on-the-ground trade requirements. The drawback, however, is to leave the financier sticking to the headquarter balance-sheet and losing some opportunities through missing some of the trade finance market knowledge.  

ITFA recently highlighted a plausible alternative: the structured LC. This remains an unexplored territory and could bring tremendous value for banks. 

Such conclusions also apply to vanilla products such as trade loans and LC refinancing. Based on our experience, many tier 2 banks in west Africa do not benefit from post-financing while their clients’ trade cycle often require several months of funding post-delivery. The FC stress does not fully explain such a shortage. Indeed, several international players put in the same risk approach the LC confirmation and the refinancing as long as the full trade cycle does not exceed the 1Y basket. On the other hand, some DFIs may provide longer resources but often lack the trade finance knowledge which makes such cash use more expensive and eventually dealbreaker. Still a lack of quality information rather than a credit-risk concern. 

Macro and micro governance requirements

FCI, along with Afreximbank, claims that one of the key elements to succeed in factoring in Africa are the expertise and promotion. Mauritius, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and South Africa put aside, Senegal remains an exception in the French-speaking region through the likes of BNDE or SENFAC, paving the way to make the product widely eligible for funds and banks. We believe such a requirement also applies to trade finance overall and must occur both at a regulatory and bank levels: (i) governance rules improvement (compliance, internal procedures, IT, reports) and perhaps more importantly the promotion of adequate structuring, such as the Afrexim Trade Finance Intermediaries (TFIs) programme. The set-up of further innovative solutions shall be backed by joint efforts of international banks, DFIs, boutiques, insurers, and brokers. 

Among those, the risk mitigation just like factoring sadly almost does not exist today. For example, the Central Bank of West African Countries has set for commercial banks a RWA minimum threshold of 20% whenever an “insurance” cover is demonstrated. This, however, does not take into account the insurer’s credit rating, nor does it promote the secondary market recourse by imposing a heavy 50 percent RWA on banking partners rated from A+ to A-. From a culture perspective, there might be a reluctance to let a client eventually slip through their hands and the prospect of making less money should they pursue risk-sharing agreements with peers. It’s a glass half-empty rather than half-full approach; however, remains a positive first step to be fine-tuned. 

We are regularly being asked whether the concern about derisking in Africa relates to the balance-sheet size of banks. In such a case, size does not matter. There would be reduced bottlenecks should some small and mid-sized banks merge but that would not address the mandatory governance improvement to reassure their correspondent banks and financiers and the need-to-know requirements. As recently heard by a reputable Head of financial investment of an African-active banking player, the solution comes from the quality information and sharing (ndlr between international lenders, domestic FIs and regulators). Still a work-in-progress.    

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What is Correspondent Banking?

Correspondent Banking basically refers to a bank (‘the Correspondent’) providing remote services to another one (‘the Respondent’).

While the Correspondent may offer the Respondent FX and treasury services, this paper focuses on Correspondent Banking as a Trade Finance enhancer and therefore primarily refers to two separates but often complementary concepts:

1. The access to trade limits, usually unsecured, whose most common form is a guarantee provided to an exporter securing the importer credit and country risks and at times short-term debt accomodating the contract cash-cycle of the importer;

• The access to foreign-based institutions providing FIs current accounts in a denominated currency given the non-presence of Respondent in said country (e.g. a Senegalese bank requiring the opening of a EUR account given its non-physical presence in Europe);  

Where lie the Correspondent Banking challenges nowadays?

It looks common sense that any particular, corporate or institution deserves to hold an account in any currency required. In recent years, digitalization across Africa has facilitated the access to the banking system of the most fragile ones. This remains, however, a major concern for most Subsaharan African financial institutions. The 2009 crisis had a profound effect on how international banking players considered correspondent banking in Africa.

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Three main factors explain to the on-going stress following 2009 crisis:

1. The regulatory requirements

They struck hard on the financial market. Among collateral damages, an overall reduction of exposure on financing capital-intensive activities such as project financing and trade finance, with Africa and Asia being the two continents suffering the most. The more fragile countries and institutions are, the higher are the capital and KYC monitoring constraints. The acceptable balance between risks and costs were overdue for many banking players. Thus, leading to this derisking process.

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2. Exit of historical players

Along with Barclays and BPCE, the French BNP Paribas seceding its subsidiaries in Burkina, Mali and Guinea Conakry illustrates the long-standing process of international first-class players exiting the continent. By their size, market knowledge, and reputation, these banks were and are the players which are in the best position to offer correspondent banking services in USD/EUR to African FIs.

So what is next? One can argue this had a very positive effect by enabling pan-African banks to expand at a spectacular pace during the 2010s. For instance, the Burkinabe CORIS Bank has expanded across the 2010s in 9 countries, have multiplied by 5 its revenues et by 4 its assets base. And they would be right to be proud of such achievements: African banks for African people should be the law. However, these ‘new’ players do not entirely fill the gap left by Europe & America. It is currently market practice to see African FIs being restricted – on top of usual KYC & compliance checks – on their USD transactions. Sometimes for a lack of settlement capacity or by Respondent’s inability to provide a certain minimum required of EUR and/or other currency transactions to the fold.

3. Business model reshaping

Aforementioned constraints led to two choices: step away or show flexibility. Either banks reduced or sometimes eliminated these services which were no longer considered as strategic, or pushed alternative choices to serve their client base. For example, the Mauritius based MCB now promotes random advisory services for African banks in the likes of IT set-up and support & risk management services: commissions-based rather than credit-risk orientated services.

The threats of ‘derisking’

While the IMF considers banks are as of 2020 not as heavily leveraged as pre-2009 times, the COVID-19 pandemic gives rise to the same concerns international players active in Africa have had after 2009 crisis: fear of sovereign downgrade, increased credit risks and liquidity shortfall. More than 10 years apart, different causes may beget the same consequences:

• Endanger right conduct of African FI trade business, be it through open account transactions or trade-related transactions (LCs, SBLC, avalised drafts); 
• Damage continent sustainability in the long run by not being in a position to accommodate key imports (commodities and semi-finished products for industrial aims) and exports – potential lack of FC access being another key risk;
• Impair domestic and international reputation i.e. « is this bank still viable? » and eventually narrowing its steady assets and liabilities base (less trust leads to less deposits);

What has Correspondent Banking to do with Africa’s trade financing gap?

The AfDB currently estimates the lack of trade financing in the continent at US$120 billion. This key topic has been largely covered in the common literature. Several key Development Financial Institutions as The Trade Development Bank – TDB (Kenya) – bring tremendous value to reduce it thanks to their guarantee programs. Among recent initiatives, CDC – the UK Development Financial Institution – has reached a monthly record last march with an exposure of more than $500m across 350 transactions in Africa.

As essential and precious these initiatives are, address the correspondent banking on the cash-clearing account side of things is also of importance to fully meet the objectives of reducing the gap. The AfDB estimates that only 30% of the continent’s total trades are bank-financed and among those 30%, circa 50% are executed without off-balance sheet products (i.e. w/o LCs). All others things being equal, should the Correspondent Banking not be a concern for any financial institution in subsaharan Africa, one can imagine the trade finance gap being somewhat reduced.

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This assessment lies also on the author’s study conclusions established in early 2020. It highlights that among a sample of 90 banking and financial institutions active in Africa, only circa 30% provide cash-clearing services in USD – while more than half of the world’s trade is settled through the US dollar. As a result, many Tier 2 & 3 banks across Africa have been largely suffering from this derisking process, making at times very difficult to achieve their transactions. In Mauritania, for instance, the topic was so sensitive that its Central Bank took the initiative to launch a due-diligence in the US last year to meet the regulator and banking players to reassure them. This topic is all the more manifest in the most fragile countries and small economies. They sadly happen to often be the lesser-known countries by the international banking & insurance market, compared to the usual suspects with the likes of Nigeria, Senegal or Ivory Coast.

IFC: De-Risking and Other Challenges in the Emerging Market Financial Sector

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Gateways to address such constraints

Correspondent Banking by definition is necessary but not sufficient of course. Enhancing trade finance in Africa requires on-the-ground first and foremost capital, client creditworthiness, accurate information data and visibility. With the ongoing endeavours made within the fintech and blockchain worlds, major improvements on Correspondent Banking are expected within the next 5 to 10 years:

• Enhanced credit worthiness monitoring abilities – partially based not on collateral (over 100% cash & real-estate securities are still the law in some jurisdictions) but rather from a cash-flow perspective: the credit scoring approach;  

• Facilitated technical assitance and increased transparency on actors involved across the supply chain – hence reducing risk of compliance, reputation and AML;

• Capital relief to accomodate such trade finance transactions and SMEs financing overall;  

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Correspondent Banking should in the future reinvent itself to accompany such initiatives and be an ideal companion to technical assistance initiatives provided by multilaterals and Development Financial Institutions. International and domestic commercial banks have a key milestone potential ahead for the Africa market: enhance advisory in the correspondent banking, facilitate steady, regular quality communication sharing, improve the rising of KYCC – Know Your Customer Customer – and push the value further along the supply chain.   

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This summer 2020 edition, entitled ‘Coronavirus & The Fourth Industrial Revolution’, is available for free online, covering the latest in trade, export credit insurance, receivables and supply chain, with special features on fintech and digitisation.

The post Has trade finance pulled the plug on correspondent banking? appeared first on Trade Finance Global.